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The book deals with a fascinating subject, indicated in its title: a theory of program 
semantics based on predicate logic. When I was asked to review this book, I was 
preparing a course on the subject and accepted with pleasure the opportunity to study 
what I expected to be an illuminating text from famous authors’ hands. Unfortunately 
my expectation was not met. Moreover I believe the book will not be helpful to those 
interested in the subject area. What follows is a detailed review that explains my critical 
judgment and the reasons that I cannot recommend the book. (An abridged version of 
this review appears in the June 1994 issue of The Journal of Symbolic Lagic.) 
After a summary of the contents of the book, I will discuss separately the presented 
logical framework and the development of semantics of programs. This will lead to a 
discussion of the authors’ epistemological assumptions on the notion of “proof” and the 
role of formal methods in mathematics. I will conclude with some critical remarks on 
expository aspects. 
Contents of the book. The book presents a theory of predicate transformer seman- 
tics based on first-order logic; predicate transformers are understood as functions from 
Boolean-valued terms to Boolean-valued terms. The first Part (Chapters l-6) is devoted 
to basic definitions and to first-order logic laws and their application to predicate trans- 
formers. The second Part (Chapters 7-12) deals with the (mainly, weakest precondition) 
semantics of a class of structured programs. 
Chapters 1-4 are concerned with notation. Chapter 1 (pp. l-10) discusses at length 
the notion of Boolean-valued first-order term (called a “structure”) in the Frege tradi- 
tion, which considers first-order formulae as terms which are subject to Boolean evalu- 
ation (interpretation). It also introduces a new notation for universal closure. Chapter 2 
(pp. 11-16) presents at length the usual conventions for omitting parentheses (binding 
power of operators and indication of scope of quantifiers and substitution). Chapter 3 
(pp. 17-20) introduces a notation for the L-operator (to be used for the definition of 
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functions via equations) and for function application. Chapter 4 (pp. 21-29) intro- 
duces some of the usual notational conventions from logic which allow succinctness in 
displaying short (i.e., of the order of magnitude of ten lines) derivations. Chapter 5 
(pp. 33-80) proves certain propositional (pp. 30-62) and quantificational (pp. 62- 
80) tautologies from some postulates. This is followed in Chapter 6 (pp. 81-120) by 
simple laws about duality, monotonicity and how application of predicate transformers 
distributes over quantification. Chapters 7-9 present weakest precondition semantics for 
structured nondeterministic programs built up from (essentially) assignment by sequen- 
tial composition, the alternative construct IF (a kind of nondeterministic multiple case 
distinction, pp. 121-146) and the repetitive construct DO (a kind of nondeterministic 
WHILE, pp. 147-189); IF and DO are constructed using lists of guarded commands. 
Chapter 10 (pp. 190-200) contains heuristic explanations of these constructs in opera- 
tional terms, and Chapters 11 and 12 (pp. 201-214) explain the strongest postcondition 
semantics of those constructs. 
On Part One. The book fails most seriously in Part One, which deals with first-order 
logic. The authors state that “this is not a treatise on logic” (pp. vii, 11) and that 
their “task of designing the theory [viz. of predicate transformer semantics] . . . as an 
exercise in formal mathematics” (p. v) only called for “a few notational adaptations of 
the predicate calculus . . . and the adoption of a carefully designed, strict format for our 
proofs” (p. v). And yet they do not simply “introduce the reader to the repertoire of 
general formulae that will be used throughout”, but instead they “develop the calculus of 
boolean structures” and spend 91 out of 215 pages “proving all formulae that have not 
been postulated” (p. 30). For a book on a theory of predicate transformer semantics, 
intended to provide “a means for defining programming language semantics in a way 
that would directly support the systematic development of programs from their formal 
specifications” (p. v), it would surely have been appropriate to presuppose what is 
needed from predicate logic, or simply to list and perhaps briefly explain it. It is 
indeed highly laudable to separate the computer scientist’s concern with “systematic 
development of programs from their formal specifications” (p. v) from the logician’s 
concern with presenting and explaining, in a clean and succinct way, the “repertoire 
of general formulae that will be used” (p. 30) and proving them “from a restricted 
repertoire” (pp. vi, 21, 28). Software engineers, like any other engineers, should have 
no problem in using logico-mathematical aws without knowing all of the details of their 
justificatory theory. By developing at length their own logical calculus, the authors open 
themselves to the inevitable comparison with the presentation of first-order logic laws 
in dozens of treatises on formal logic. 
Certainly, a part of the logician’s task is to justify logical laws that are to be used. 
For this purpose, it is indeed often helpful to seek “a modest repertoire” (p. vi) of 
postulates-or better, a “repertoire” that is “appropriate” or “adequate” for the specific 
purpose-from which all the laws to be justified (usually relative to a certain semantics) 
can be proved in a formal way. Therefore, the task consists in providing, within a formal 
calculus, proofs for all the laws under consideration (so-called completeness) and in 
justifying the postulates (axioms and rules) used in the proofs (so-called soundness). 
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An additional epistemological or pragmatic task is to give the reasons that this particular 
(set of postulates for the) calculus has been chosen. Whether a justification is satis- 
factory depends, not only on the class of logical laws under study-“which laws will 
be used”-, but also on where and how one wants to use them (for which subject or 
purpose, whether for mathematicians or engineers, and whether for pencil and paper or 
machine manipulations). Note that the request for such justification is a methodological 
imperative for whatever logical “calculus” is proposed; it cannot simply be dispensed 
with by a “naive refusal to make some of his [the logician’s] cherished distinctions” 
(p. vii). 
The authors-heading for what “seemed at first a rather presumptuous undertaking” 
(p. vi), namely “a revision of mathematical methodology” (ibid.)-place themselves 
in the position of trying to redo the modern predicate calculus. Unfortunately, they 
remain behind what Frege had accomplished in his Bepffsschrifi in 1879 and his 
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik in 1893 and 1903, not to mention what has been achieved 
in the subsequent 100 years of research in logic. The authors introduce postulates 
without any justification of their special status with respect to derived formulae, of 
their soundness, or of their completeness. They do not even mention that a justification 
problem exists-except that they say that these postulates suffice to prove from them, in 
the particular proof style chosen, “the repertoire of general formulae that will be used 
throughout the remainder of this booklet” (p. 30). One is led to wonder whether new 
postulates or proof principles will be needed (and if so, which) if one seeks to extend 
the approach to the semantics of programs with more complicated features than those 
considered in this book (see below). There is no indication as to whether this repertoire 
has any other characterization than that of the finite set of the formulae that happen 
to “be used throughout the remainder of this booklet”. Will the process of adding new 
first-order postulates or laws ever end or reach a limit? For predicate logic, generations 
of logicians have developed satisfactory and simple answers to that kind of fundamental 
questions. The authors could and should have used these achievements to their advantage, 
instead of coming up with a pale imitation of a “theory” of derivations-derivation of 
some “repertoire” from a few postulates which appear in the book like “mathematical 
rabbits-pulled out of a hat” (p. ix). Note that everywhere in the book “mathematical 
rabbits” are very much criticized, and I think correctly so. 
This attitude of the authors to the problem of justification is so surprising because it 
contradicts their own principles, clearly and convincingly stated, in support of a compu- 
tational approach to program design from specifications: “The ‘mindless’ manipulation 
of uninterpreted formulae that is implied by ‘letting the symbols do the work’ is clearly 
impossible without a sufficiently clear view of the permissible calculations” (p. 11). Is 
such a clear view of the calculations within first-order logic not provided by a sound 
and complete calculus for predicate logic? It is the separation of mathematically precise 
syntax from semantics and their equivalence (through the soundness and completeness 
theorems) which allows the “mindless’‘-but semantically safe-“manipulation of unin- 
terpreted formulae” and, more important, the combined use of syntactical manipulations 
and semantical reasoning that is so typical and fruitful in applications of predicate logic. 
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As a reviewer, I still must answer the question whether the particular calculus de- 
veloped here offers a better proof format than other systems of first-order (formal) 
logic. The authors themselves do not compare their system with any other system in 
the literature; indeed, they do not even mention that there are others. But the authors 
repeat frequently (and mostly when commenting on particular formulae or proofs) their 
conviction-they call it “evidence’‘-“that most mathematicians lack the tools needed 
for the skillful manipulation of formulae” (p. vi). Perhaps, this statement is intended 
to point out that in the field of formal program specification, most (though not all, see 
below) of the methods developed during the last 25 years lead to unacceptable combi- 
natorial explosion when applied to real systems. But this phenomenon appears only far 
beyond the point to which the authors lead us in this book; it certainly does not present 
itself at the level of deriving mostly well-known and simple laws of first-order logic, 
The authors looked for a proof format that fits the needs of a human programmer who 
uses laws of predicate logic for the systematic development of programs from formal 
specifications. The proposed proof format for predicate logic is geared to truth-value 
preserving transformations of formulae (Boolean-valued terms) based on equations al- 
lowing functional notation. Let me note, en passant, that the latter idea is not new: it 
has been extensively investigated in algebraic and term logic literature, but the authors 
seem not to be aware of this. (See, for example, L. Henkin, J.D. Monk and A. Tarski, 
Cylindric Algebras (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 197 1) , and H. Hermes, Eine Termlogik 
mit Auswahloperutor, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, Vol. 6 (Springer, Berlin, 1965)) 
and the references given there). The crucial criticism is this: despite many lengthy ex- 
planations of the need for a neat and expressive framework and despite much expression 
of pride in the (alleged) “beauty” of their system, the authors present a proof format 
which is considerably clumsier, less transparent, and more difficult to use (in proofs 
and in teaching “the design of beautiful, formal proofs”, p. vi) than various well-known 
frameworks in the literature. 
Let us check this judgment using criteria that the authors themselves regard as estab- 
lishing the “virtues of presenting formal proofs in a strict format”; in particular, (a) “that 
it enables a meaningful comparison between alternative proofs of the same theorem, viz. 
by comparing the text”, and (b) the “greater homogeneity it introduces into the task of 
proof design, a task that becomes a challenge in text manipulation that is more or less 
independent of what the theorem was about” (p. vi). For comparison let US consider 
the well-known polynomial representation of Boolean-valued terms due to 1.1. Shegalkin 
(Mat. Sb. 34 (1927) and 35 (1928)) and in dual form to J. Herbrand (Dissertation, 
1930), which can be found in various textbooks on first-order logic. Every Boolean- 
valued term x is (uniquely) representable as a polynomial 55 in its free variables with 
coefficients 0,l; conjunction corresponds to multiplication mod2, exclusive disjunction 
(not the inclusive “or” to which the authors refer to on page 42) to addition mod2, 
negation to “+l modulo 2”, true to 1, and false to 0. (By the way, this gives rise to 
an elegant Boolean ring structure Z/22 [ x I . . .x,1, where Z is the ring of integers.) 
Hence for arbitrary Boolean-valued terms x, y one has the following equations, where 
for notational convenience I suppress overlining (identifying z with Z): 
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xAy=xy, xvy=x+y, Tc=x+l, 
and therefore also 
x+-+y=x+y+l, x+y=xy+x+l, xvy=x+y+xy, 
The tautologies are exactly those Boolean-valued terms t whose polynomial represen- 
tation t equals 1 mod2. In this way, literally all “theorems” proved by the authors in their 
“calculus of boolean structures” (pp. 30-80) become trivial, and this despite the fact that 
in polynomial notation they are established in much more general, surely uniform, more 
homogeneous, more succinct, simpler, and more transparent versions. (These properties 
are all claimed by the authors for their theorems and proofs, in comparison with those 
in other logical calculi, not specified.) 
Here are three “small examples” (p. 43) ; I do not insist that each of them “shows in its 
full horror how an unfortunate notation can damage one’s manipulative abilities” (ibid.), 
but they do not lack some small horror of their own. First, half a page (pp. 32/33) 
is spent in explaining the universal quantification of the formula x H y cf y cf x as 
expressing-according to much fussed-over conventions for omitting parentheses-both 
the symmetry of logical identity (equivalence) and the left- and right-identity property 
of (y H y) with respect to equivalence. By the way, it is not clear to me why we 
should make such a fuss over a mnemonic device-nothing more than a traditional 
“pons asinorum”-which due to some notational conventions permits in some (how 
many interesting?) cases the representation of conceptually different ideas by a single 
logical formula. But never mind, transforming x H y c+ y ++ x into polynomial 
notation (by applying x H y = (x + 1) + y three times, say from left to right) yields 
x+1+(y+1+(y+1+x))=2x+2y+3.But2x.+2y+3=lmod2,whichisan 
instance of the obvious and general polynomial equation xi 2nixi + 2m + 1 = 1 mod 2. 
The second example involves the definition of conjunction in terms of equivalence and 
inclusive disjunction-namely x A y cf x ci y ++ x V y (p. 37)--, introduced as “The 
Golden Rule” and used with corresponding great pomp. Transforming this definition 
into polynomial notation yields the (easily generalizable) trivial equation 
The third example comes during a lengthy discussion of propositional logic manip- 
ulations of “expressions that make heavy use of the implication”. We are told that “in 
combination with the negation sign, hell breaks loose, as is shown by the following 
eight expressions. . .” (p. 61) . These eight expressions are nothing more than rewritings, 
modulo the law of contraposition, of x V y -+ x A y, and transforming this expression 
into polynomial notation yields its equivalence to x +-+ y by: 
(x+y+xy)xy+ (x+y+xy) + 1 =4xy+x+y+ 1 =x+y+ lmod2 
-the authors spend half a page for their proof which comes spiced with pompous 
methodological comments (p. 62). In polynomial notation, no “hell breaks loose” when 
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a busy little demon adds an even number of occurrences of xy or x or y to the above 
expression for x + y + 1: it yields the general elimination rule 
(This rule contains as special case the above-mentioned eight expressions discussed by 
the authors.) And so forth for the entire long Chapter 5 and most of Chapter 6. 
The book also exhibits some unclear and confusing definitions, paired with clumsy 
notation, for phenomena which have already a better and well-established definition 
and notation in the literature. For example, on page 8, an “everywhere operator” is 
introduced which plays an important role throughout the book. But the “definition” is 
obscure, elaborated later (see pp. 10, 23, 58) and only at the end the experienced reader 
is able to guess what was intended. I asked more than ten top logicians and computer 
scientists to read the relevant early sections and then to explain their meaning. None 
of them had understood matters, because the notation is “almost as cryptic as Frege’s 
notation”, as one from this group said after I had explained to him what the definition 
and notation meant; and he continued: “only in Frege’s days it was a great merit to have 
invented a full and correct notation at all.” The everywhere operator expresses essentially 
universal closure without explicitly writing down all the variables concerned. The usual 
logical notation v or simply V, besides being established, is more suggestive; it can also 
be extended, very naturally and without further words, to existential closure 3, whereas 
our authors would have to invent yet another new notation. Another use the authors often 
make of their everywhere operator can also be described much more simply by the well- 
known tautology rule, which states that the validity of a first-order law is not affected 
by replacing a propositional variable by a first-order formula (which may contain fresh 
free individual variables). It comes as no surprise that proof format and notation [ ] 
for the everywhere operator induce the authors to state and prove “theorems” which 
express trivial logical facts, for instance, the idempotence of [ ] (p. 32), or the validity 
of (what they call) Leibniz’ rule for so called punctual functions which is a case of 
%a -+ P) --) (EY -+I). 
Here are two more examples of rather obscure definitions. On page 10, one finds the 
“definition” of application of [ ] to term pairs, a definition that becomes understandable 
only much later in the book (p. 58) and essentially expresses the fact that universal 
quantification distributes over conjunction. (Note that it is rather unfortunate to speak 
here about “pairing” because conjunction is associative and commutative, but pairing is 
not.) On page 18, one finds again a rather confusing “definition” of the well-known 
description (iota) operator in the context of defining functions by equations. The reader 
has to struggle through misleading phrases such as “the global variables of a scalar” 
and unfortunate hiding of variables and quantifiers in a context where their presentation 
would have helped the understanding. Also, it is not clear why the proposed new 
notation y : [ y = (Y] should replace the usual LY [ y = a], established by Whitehead and 
Russell in their “Principia Mathematics” ( 1910-1913). Logic has taken years of work to 
develop fairly standard methods and notations. Changing notation without serious reason 
provides no good service, isolating the reader from the rest of the scientific community. 
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The authors’ decision to use-for an “abstraction” of expressions in (program) 
variables-the name “structure” instead of the usual name (Boolean-valued) “term” 
is unfortunate. As a matter of fact, “modern mathematical usage” in logic has not been 
“reluctant to introduce a name for an expression in a number of variables” (p. 4)) and 
logic has provided methods for avoiding the danger that “those names may become quite 
tricky to manipulate” (p. 4). This is done in full generality, but in particular in term 
logic, where “formulas’are viewed as Boolean-valued terms. (This comes naturally from 
a systematic treatment of Whitehead’s and Russell’s description operator; see, in par- 
ticular, Chapter 8 in D. Hilbert and F! Bernays, Grundlagen der Mathematik (Springer, 
Berlin, 2nd ed., 1968) and its further development in the book by Hermes cited above.) 
I have some reservations also about a number of minor but misleading remarks, which 
reveal that the authors are not really acquainted with the field of mathematical logic. 
For example, they seem to believe that they had discovered the usefulness-in proving 
certain theorems-of not breaking equivalences into separate implications. But from 
automated theorem proving systems it is well-known that one should, if possible, avoid 
breaking equivalences into separate implications. However, in the case of formulae such 
as 3xcu +-+ 3yp, one may have different witnesses in the two directions and therefore 
need to handle the two implications separately. 
Summarizing my judgment of the first part of the book, I recommend to those who 
wish to learn just the elementary facts which are needed from first-order logic for a 
formulation of the weakest precondition approach within predicate logic: read one of 
the excellent texts Logic and Structure by D. van Dalen, Springer-Verlag, or Logic for 
Computer Scientists by U. Schoning, Birkhhser, Boston. In each case, if the proof 
of the completeness theorem and related material is skipped, there are fewer than one 
hundred pages to read to reach the point where the book under review switches from 
logic to semantics of programs. 
On Part Two. In the second part of the book, the authors are in their metier; they 
explain predicate transformer semantics, and write as experts of the field. But there, too, 
many critical questions remain. 
At first sight, it appears surprising that the authors treat only structured (nondeter- 
ministic) programs built from assignment (and simple basic programs abort, skip, a 
nondeterministic stop) by sequential composition, the alternative construct IF , and the 
repetitive construct DO. Over the past 25 years we have seen many approaches (struc- 
tural operational, axiomatic, algebraic, denotational, etc.) developed around such simple 
programs; and some calculi deal with structured programs successfully, in a balanced 
and transparent way, and not without mathematical elegance. (The reader may look, for 
example, at the brilliant exposition in tirz@ation of Sequential and Concurrent Pro- 
grams by K.R. Apt and E.-R. Olderog (Springer Texts and Monographs in Computer 
Science, 1991), where deterministic (pp. 55-105) and nondeterministic (pp. 106-176) 
sequential programs are treated as a prerequisite for a detailed study of parallel and 
distributed programs.) But the presentation of the calculus in the book under review, 
pressed into a corset of an unfortunate notation and proof format, lacks conceptual 
clarity and surely the beauty that Dijkstra has achieved in his book A Discipline of Pro- 
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grumming (Prentice-Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ, 1976) and advertises as his trademark 
(see the editors’ explanations of the title of the book Beauty is Our Business, A Birthday 
Salute to E.u! Dijkstra, W.H.J. Feijen et al., eds., Springer Texts and Monographs in 
Computer Science, Vol. 21, 1990). 
Secondly I can see no real progress in this calculus over previous presentations of the 
weakest precondition approach-except for minor technicalities, see, for example, the 
discussion of the role of or-continuity in the proof of the “Main Repetition Theorem” 
(pp. 180-185). The treatment of this theorem-a modulo some technical refinement 25 
years old theorem which constitutes the culminating point of Chapter 9 on “Semantics of 
repetition”-reveals a similar kind of unacceptable “incompleteness” (or authors’ bias) 
which we have encountered already in the first part of the book. The “Main Repetition 
Theorem” establishes the soundness of a specific “rule” for the DO construct. It thereby 
corresponds to the soundness theorem for loop rules (proof rules for termination) in 
Hoare-like systems. The natural counterpart is the completeness problem, whether all 
relevant true formulae can be proved this way. This problem has been extensively studied 
(see Apt and Olderog, op.cit., Ch. 3.6, Ex. 4.20 and the references given there). The 
authors of the book under review do not tell the reader what such completeness could 
mean in their approach; they do not even pose the question or at least mention that such 
a question can and has been asked. 
Finally, it does not become clear whether and how the theory developed by the authors 
could deal with extensions to, for example, concurrent or reactive programs, programs 
allowing recursion with parameters, multiprocessing, more sophisticated forms of control 
and data structures, etc. 
Operational semantics seems to be a victim of attack by the authors (pp. 121-125). 
They argue correctly against an absolute, physical understanding of “machines” and 
“computation step”. But the approach of structural operational semantics a la Plotkin-to 
mention just one example-is not at all based on such a physical notion of machine. One 
can also successfully base operational semantics on a notion of (classes of) machines at 
various levels of abstraction, related hierarchically by the method of stepwise refinement. 
This permits a transparent, mathematically precise, and simple operational semantics, as 
well as formal specifications, and mathematical correctness proofs for real languages and 
systems. The conceptually operational character allows one to couple intuitive insight 
with mathematical rigor of method and thereby to settle challenging questions by proofs 
which satisfy appropriate mathematical standards without necessarily being proofs in 
a “calculus”. The framework of “evolving algebras” recently proposed by Y. Gurevich 
shows that this is indeed possible. 
This brings me to a fundamental criticism of the book’s approach to design and 
formal verification of proofs and programs. The authors suggest that we identify the 
mathematical notion of “proof” with “formal proofs” and the latter with “formal proofs 
in a strict format” (p. vi), namely the one developed in this book “for a revision 
of mathematical methodology” (p. vi). The authors praise their proof format rather 
extensively, and the reader “is invited to share [the authors’] delight” (pp. v-vi). I read 
the book carefully, slowly (as the authors ask on page vii) and with patience-it took 
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me two months of work to go through it three times. I read it not only “with an open 
mind”( as recommended by the authors on p. vii) but with an initial very positive bias- 
but to my disappointment I found nothing which could justify the authors’ “hope [that 
the reader] travelled long and far” (p. vii). It is one thing-reasonable and standard- 
to adopt, for a specific purpose, an appropriate particular proof format which allows to 
break down (writing, explaining, and checking of) unavoidable routine calculations into 
simple sequences of easily manageable steps; see in this respect the use Apt and Olderog 
make of Dijkstra’s proof format for development and verification of programs (op.cit., 
p. 42, etc.). A completely different and I believe wrong thing is what the authors suggest, 
namely to press every form of construction of and reasoning about programs into such 
a restricted format. This decision of the authors to limit problems and solutions to 
those which fit their proof format not only “shows in its full horror how an unfortunate 
notation can damage one’s manipulative abilities” (p. 43) and one’s intuition. Worse than 
that, it shows how the underlying conception of mathematical reasoning as formalistic 
(calculational) activity limits the horizon of mathematical research to what can be 
reached by mere symbol pushing. As a matter of fact, the reader who follows the book 
has to go a long way-the formalist’s way-but without being brought far and without 
reaching a destination one could recommend. From this point of view it appears not any 
more surprising, but certainly significant, that the authors-after 25 years of intensive 
work (see p. 184)) “in possession of a tool [viz. the theory developed in this book] that 
surpassed [their] wildest expectations” and that “became an absolute delight to work 
with” (p. v)“, writing a monograph reflecting the current state of our art” (p. vii) [my 
italics] -treat only structured IF/DO programs. 
Still more significant in this context seems to me the following fact: at the very 
point where-after 170 pages of preparation-the authors start with their description 
of the “semantics of repetition” (Chapter 9), they cannot really give their definitions 
“without pulling a sizeable rabbit out of the magician’s hat” (p. 184)-one of those 
“mathematical rabbits” the authors frequently and rightly insist on “exorcising” (p. ix). 
Indeed they declare (p. 171) : “We shall now define predicate transformers wlp.DO and 
wp.DO. We suggest that in this [NB: 20 pages long] chapter the reader just accept 
these definitions as such, without wondering from where they come or what has inspired 
them [my italics]. Such background information [my italics] will be provided in the 
next chapter.” Chapter 10, entitled “Operational Considerations” [my italics], eventually 
provides the basic intuitions which make the whole thing work. The authors show by 
their book what is the price for banning simple and rigorous descriptions of the basic 
operational intuitions from a formal definition of program semantics: the price is a messy 
apparatus for formal representation, which produces alienation even in the willing reader. 
The one who learns semantics of programs in this way will have difficulties to appreciate 
the usefulness of formal (mathematically precise) methods in the area. 
Let me state what helps more than the preceding 189 pages of the (220-page) book 
under review: a clean conceptual framework that allows us to make our basic operational 
experience mathematically manageable and precise in such a way that the framework 
turns into an interesting object of study for mathematically inclined theoreticians, and 
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into a really helpful tool for programmers. I mentioned above an example of such a 
framework. Another, quite different but very illuminating, example for comparison is 
the book Compilerbau by N. Wirth (Teubner, Stuttgart, 1984, 118 pages, expanded ver- 
sion of the last Chapter of Wirth’s book “Algorithms + Data Structures = Programs”, 
Prentice-Hall, 1976), a jewel of clarity, precision, and simplicity. In 83 pages, starting 
from scratch, by stepwise refinement and with good “heuristics from which most of the 
arguments emerged most smoothly” (p. vi of the book being reviewed), it develops a full 
compiler for a language that contains (besides assignment, composition, IF-THEN-ELSE 
and WHILE) procedures and elementary input and output instructions. In my teaching 
in computer science over the past twenty years, I have found that Wirth’s methodology 
really achieves what the authors claim for their calculus: it “turned the design of beau- 
tiful programs into an eminently teachable subject” (p. vi). (Paraphrasing the authors’ 
wording, I have taken the liberty of replacing “formal proofs” by “programs”.) 
I am afraid “the mathematically inclined computer scientists and the mathemati- 
cians with methodological and formal interest”-the authors’ declared target audience 
(p. viii)-may turn their backs on computer science should they fall victim to the 
authors’ suggestion that “this was all” (p. vii) one could do to fruitfully use logic, or 
more generally formal mathematical methods, for systematic development of programs 
from their specifications. My conception of the role of formal methods in computer 
science, logic, and mathematics is rather different from what the authors call their “new 
appreciation of the mathematical activity” (p. vi). My experience shows me that the for- 
mal instrumentarium that modern abstract mathematics has created has not diminished 
but increased the power and the range of “intuitive precise” mathematical reasoning-a 
reasoning which takes advantage of the help offered by “calculational [forms of] rea- 
soning” (p. vii) but without exhausting itself in pure formalism. I do not believe that 
purely formalist, merely “calculational reasoning” will solve the difficult and challenging 
mathematical problems we are facing in computer science. 
Summarizing my judgment of the second part of the book under review, I recommend 
to the interested reader to study Part II (pp. 55-176) of the above-mentioned book by 
Apt and Olderog. I guess this reading will produce much curiosity to continue reading 
also of Parts III and IV on parallel and distributed programs, pp. 177-324, 325-416. 
On the style of writing. Further criticism concerns expository aspects. The style in 
which the book is written is rather unusual for a scientific text. It is full of phrases 
that seem to aim at involving the reader emotionally instead of convincing by rational 
arguments. The presentation is flat: even the most trivial proposition is called “Theorem”; 
the reader is given only very scattered hints that would enable him to distinguish between 
simple and difficult, technical and profound, routine and creative matters or techniques. 
The authors are so much concerned with (or delighted by) “letting the symbols do 
the work” (lot. cit.) that they often neglect to provide necessary basic motivation. For 
example, although nondeterministic programs play a basic role for the whole approach 
in the book, the reader finds only scattered remarks explaining why nondeterministic 
constructs are useful at all; this is essentially only at the end of Chapter 7 (pp. 145-146). 
Another example is provided by the definition of determinacy, advertised on the book 
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cover. This definition is purely formal (p. 131), no attempt is made to tell the reader 
whether for example this “determinacy” of programs means (a) uniqueness of output, or 
(b) that in all occurring cases the occurring guards are disjoint. But the authors do write 
that they “think it worthwhile to note that, as a definition, it is very nice and, by being so, 
gives an encouraging indication that we have introduced appropriate concepts.” (p. 132) 
Maybe it can be accepted that no references at all are given-although a novice in 
the field might like to be in a position to relate this text to work in the literature. It 
is less acceptable that the authors, by alluding to some and hiding or ignoring other 
historical sources, produce a distorted view of their own achievements. For example, 
on pp. 6-9, Recorde is celebrated for having introduced, in 1557, the symbol “=” to 
denote equality, then Boole is celebrated for having assigned (in 1854) to this symbol 
“in principle the full status of an infix operator that assigned a value to expressions 
of the form a = b”, after which the reader is taught that “[the authors’] decision to 
introduce an explicit symbol for functional application is the natural counterpart of 
Recorde’s decision to do so for equality” (p. 9), namely f.n. No mention is made of 
Frege’s and others’ fundamental contribution to a correct logical definition of identity 
(see below). No mention is made of Schoenfinkel, Curry, or the &calculus tradition 
where more than just a notation for functional application can be found. In the same 
context, the decision to treat logical formulae as Boolean-valued terms is suggested to be 
an invention of the authors, instead of mentioning Frege or the term logic approach. The 
authors “honour” Leibniz through baptizing one of their cherished rules “the Rule of 
Leibniz” (p. 9). This rule expresses preservation of equality under function application: 
x = y --+ f(x) = f(y). But the authors do not tell us that this implication expresses 
only a restriction (namely to function application) of the trivial direction of Leibniz’ 
fundamental and profound discovery known in the literature as principium indiscemibil- 
ium; this principle provided the epistemological ground for the first logico-mathematical 
definition of identity, given by Frege improving on Boole (the interested reader will find 
more details in J.M. Bochenski, For-male L.ogik (Alber, Freiburg 1956, pp. 413-416)). 
The above criticism deals with the form and content of the book under review. 
There is no doubt whatsoever that Dijkstra has substantially contributed to computer 
science, and that he will be rightfully remembered for these contributions; in the case 
of the combination computer science-logic, however, his present contribution will not 
undergo the same fate. The writing of this review has been a slow and painful process, 
brought to an end only thanks to encouragement and help from numerous colleagues who 
obviously remain anonymous. The problem was that I had expected from Dijkstra a truly 
outstanding book-but found instead a thoroughly disappointing and misleading one. 
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